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The Logical Structure of Consciousness (behavior, personality, rationality, higher order thought, intentionality) 
 
    Michael Starks 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and 
philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) 
and from the 50’s to the present by his logical successor John Searle, I have created the following table as an 
heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of 
behavior (LSB), of personality (LSB), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the 
Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent 
writings. I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description may consult my full article  
The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind  and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Ludwig  
Wittgenstein and John Searle (2016), and reviews of books by Wittgenstein, Searle and others on academia.edu, 
vixra.org, philpapers.org, researchgate.net  and on Amazon. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior 
(LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order 
Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by Searle, and 
correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker.  
The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as 
revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no 
gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2  and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes  
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
 
Yes 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Describe a Mental 
State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place(H+N,T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, Representations, 
truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as 
presentations by others ( or COS1 by myself). 
 
*            Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
 
**         Searle’s  PriorIntentions 
 ***      Searle’s Intention In Action 
 
****    Searle’s Direction of Fit 
 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this causally self- 
referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on 
Human Nature. One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described 
the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, 
we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away 
from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences 
(language games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the 
brain present to consciousness, are automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 
2 is abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious deliberation (S2D-my 
terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also become automated 
(S2A-my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to 
full awareness.  Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term 
memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than true or 
false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual experience-the presentation of 
our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the same words (as the same COS - Searle) as we 
describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or 
public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically connected. E.g., Emotion, 
Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong 
to cognitive system 1, will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, 
occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are independent of 
general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary 
content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) cannot precisely match 
the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of 
contexts (in sentences and in the world), and in the infinite variations of ‘brain states’ (‘mental states or 
the pattern of activations of billions of neurons that can correspond to ‘seeing a red apple’) and this is 
one reason why it’s not possible to ‘reduce’ higher order behavior to a ‘system of laws’ which would 
have to state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. And what 
counts as ‘reducing’ and as a ‘law’ and a ‘system’ (see e.g., Nancy Cartwright).This is a special case of the 
irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones that has been explained many times by 
Searle, DMS, Hacker, W and others.  
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make complex 
series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive 
actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, 
automated, subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, informationless, true-
only mental states with a precise time and location, and over time there evolved in higher cortical 
centers S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and 
future and often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or 
dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, 
conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for 
truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), 
representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false 
propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental 
states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions (described 
by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world 
and not to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly developing and 
changing results of  S2 dispositions (W-‘Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others 
are typical S1— automatic and fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime.  My first person statements about 
myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about others are true or 
false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and memories-- 
were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed “inclinations” or 
“dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often 
been noted that this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing , 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle 
(e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public 
representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space, while the 
evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now.  
This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after 
System 1—the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them as occurring in 
another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and 
volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System 
One) are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by primary LG’s ( PLG’s -- e.g., 
I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., 
axiomatic as I prefer or  animal reflexes as W and DMS describe.  Dispositions can be described as 
secondary LG’s ( SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own 
case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of 
the well known books on W by Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when spoken 
or written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 
1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein 
can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2.  After Wittgenstein 
laid the groundwork for the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown 
Books in the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table in his 
classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of 
evolutionary psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in 
his last work ‘On Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or 
Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in 
philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior.  Perception, Memory, Reflexive 
actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, in which the mind 
automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle)--the unquestionable, true-only, 
axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible. 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities— 
that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all 
the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 
working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2(The Phenomenological 
Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of 
examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so 
we use consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems 
or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try 
to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act 
(Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the 
thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. Disposition words can 
be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to 
describe abilities (agents as they act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called 
“Propositional Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(believing, knowing, 
understanding, thinking, etc.,-actual or potential public acts such as language(thought, mind) also called 
Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no 
language(concept,thought)ofprivatementalstatesforthinkingorwilling(i.e.,noprivatelanguage, thought or 
mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public psychology. 
 
Perceptions: (X is True):Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch,Temperature  
 
Memories:  Remembering (X was true) 
 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X  might become True) : 
 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, Thinking, Representing, 
Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), 
Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring , 
Expecting, Wishing , Wanting, Hoping( a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, 
Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. Their function is to 
modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating 
information processing of perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation 
between S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. We can think of 
them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts) : Longing, Hoping, 
Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 ACTIONS: (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, Persuading, Showing, 
Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, 
Asserting (Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, 
Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer Information to others so 
they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of 
behavior (The Phenomenological Illusion  (TPI), The Blank Slate (BS)or the Standard Social Science Model 
(SSSM). 
 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of objects, nor of a single 
type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent 
to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference engines), 
which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to intentions 
and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or 
only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or 
cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. 
Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation 
of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development and 
individual action with preferences, intentions and actions.  Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive 
modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding and increase our power by 
giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, 
philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them 
faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which 
are algorithmatized by R & L (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of behavior which are 
innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and require consciousness, will and self, and 
in normal human adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public 
acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum 
expected utility or Bayesian utility maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly questionable due to 
severe underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This occurs via dominance 
and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide 
into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction 
(Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle movements), producing math, 
language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural 
psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911, 
and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree 
of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z 
p464. Much of intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, inclinations are 
sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have 
fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the dispositional verb 
“thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and rational with partial awareness(W), now described as 
the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2.  It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere 
phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are 
epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no role in 
communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state 
(unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act or event such as in 
speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have information 
(meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, 
feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become psychologically 
effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2. Developing language means manifesting the 
innate ability of advanced humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for 
acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called UA-
Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be 
called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of 
consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles—
i.e., Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and Knowing. Thus, “propositional attitude” is an 
incorrect term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow deliberative functioning of System 2) 
or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of frequently practiced System 2 functions of speech and action 
into automatic fast functions).   We see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, 
emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we already know, because “mind” 
(thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in 
neurophysiology, biochemistry , genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our 
social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of 
physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of 
interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of 
language. Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social 
interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try 
to analyze it.  This has been explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many others.  
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences have multiple uses 
depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed 
or I believe and he believes.  The present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” 
normally describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem 
(in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental state and so not based on knowledge or 
information (W and see my review of the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not 
describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. 
That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense can be causally self-reflexive--they 
instantiate themselves but then they are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2).  However past or future 
tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes”  or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved 
by information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable.   
Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I 
believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in 
spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent (which I call S2A—i.e., 
S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical Psychology in 2000). 
 
Many so called Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or abilities) of System 1 
(Tversky Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I 
think one must separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 1 
Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and 
NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-
Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
